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TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE DEFEND
TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 AND WHY THE COMPUTER
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1984 STILL MATTERS FOR
TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
Patrick J. Manion

INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property provided legal protection
due to their independent economic value. What material satisfies as a “trade secret”
depends on the jurisdiction where relief is sought and which law is applied. However,
generally a trade secret is information—including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique or process.1 Until recently, trade secrets were
unique among the various forms of intellectual property because they were not afforded federal protection.2 Indeed, today trade secret misappropriation is primarily
addressed through state versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as well as the
common law.3 Trade secret theft costs the United States economy between $300 and
$480 billion a year.4 Fights over valuable trade secret theft have ensnared some of
the largest and most recognizable names in U.S. industry.5 In recognition of this
growing concern, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 with overwhelming bipartisan support in May of 2016.6 The legislative intent of the Act was

See Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A formula, process, device, or other business
information that is kept confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors; information — including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process — that (1) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by others who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.”).
2
In contrast, federal laws existed which protected trademarks, patents, and copyrights.
3
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) and RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
1

4

S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016).

5

See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes, Senate Passes Trade-Secrets Bill, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-trade-secrets-bill-1459807973 (“DuPont Co. spent six years on a
trade-secrets case involving Kevlar, a fiber used in bulletproof vests. In that case, DuPont enlisted the Justice
Department’s help to go after Kolon Industries Inc., alleging that it had recruited former DuPont employees in
to steal technological know-how that took DuPont decades to develop. The companies ultimately settled about
a year ago, with Kolon agreeing to pay DuPont $275 million in restitution.”).
6
Office of the Clerk of The United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 172, (Apr.
27, 2016), http://clerk.house.gov/floorsummary/floor.aspx?day=20160427&today=20170225.
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to clarify conflicting state laws regarding trade secret misappropriation and to provide a new federal civil cause of action for aggrieved parties.7 Prior to passage of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, aggrieved parties had to rely on an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction or contort their claim to satisfy elements of a cause of action under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
or general criminal statutes.
The Economic Espionage Act and general criminal statutes are often ineffective.
For example, while the Economic Espionage Act “makes it a Federal criminal offense
to misappropriate a trade secret that has an interstate or foreign nexus … [the Act]
does not give trade secret owners a private right of action in Federal court.”8 Therefore, a party asserting a claim under the Economic Espionage Act must rely on the
Federal Government to criminally prosecute the case, and “while economic espionage and the theft of trade secrets is a top priority for federal law enforcement, criminal enforcement remains a limited solution to stopping trade secret theft as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice are limited in the resources
they can bring to bear.”9 Another option is to bring a trade secret misappropriation
claim under state law. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted
some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; however, state variations in the application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have led to inconsistent outcomes across
jurisdictions.10 This is where the Defend Trade Secrets Act becomes relevant by affording a new means for private parties to obtain federal jurisdiction. This allows
them to bypass the foibles of conflicting state law without the burden of providing an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction or having to use the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, the Economic Espionage Act, or general criminal statutes.
While the contours of the Defend Trade Secrets Act are still being shaped as
courts embrace this new law, two recent opinions have highlighted an interesting

7

S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016).
Id.
9
Id.
10
See ALA. CODE § 8-27-1 (1975) et seq., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910 et seq., ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401
et seq., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 et seq., CAL. <UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT CODE> § 3426 et
seq., COL. REV. STAT. § 7-74-101, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50 et seq., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2001 et seq.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-501 et seq., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 688.001 et seq., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-760 et seq.,
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482B-1 et seq., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-801 et seq., Ill. ANN. STAT. ch. 140 Secs.
351-59, IND. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1-8, 1990 90 Acts, ch. 1201 Section 550.1 et seq., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603320 et seq., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.880 et seq., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 et seq., ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1541 et seq., MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 11-1201 et seq., MICH. COP. LAWS ANN. §
445.1901 et seq., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 235C.01 et seq., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-26-1 et seq., MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 417.467, MONT. CODE ANN. § .30-14-401 et seq., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-501 et seq., NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 600A.010 et seq., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1 et seq., N.J STAT. ANN. § 56:15-1 S-et seq., N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-1 et seq., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-152 et seq., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25.1-01 et
seq., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61 et seq., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 86 et seq., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 646.461 et seq., 12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5392 et seq., tit. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-41-1 et
seq., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-1 et seq., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-1 et seq., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251701 et al., Title 6 CH 134A et al., UTAH CODE ANN. §13-24-1 et seq., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 et seq.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.010 et seq., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-1 et seq., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90,
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-101.
8
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interplay between the Act and state non-compete policies.11 Specifically, the remedies section of the Defend Trade Secrets Act states that an injunctive order under the
Act will not conflict with state laws that prohibit restraints on trade.12 This is important because a trade secret misappropriation claim is often brought in conjunction
with a claim for violation of a non-compete agreement or is brought seeking an injunction that will operate as a constructive non-compete on the former employer—
measures that amount to a restraint on trade, which may be prohibited under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Moreover, the scope of injunctive relief sought by an aggrieved party may include restraining the employment of a separated employee.
Thus, injunctive relief, a plaintiff’s preferred remedy, may be harder to obtain under
the Defend Trade Secrets Act even though the purported goal of the Act was to harmonize the application of trade secret law. Indeed, the principal argument made by
proponents of a federal trade secret remedy was the goal of uniformity.13 This Note
argues that the Defend Trade Secret Act falls short of this goal by offering a state
carve-out that limits the scope of injunctive relief available, leaving the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act as an attractive option in certain jurisdictions that disfavor or
prohibit restraints on trade and in factual scenarios where the trade secret has been
accessed electronically. This proposition has growing relevance, as one of President
Obama’s final policy initiatives was a call to action regarding the overuse and abuse
of non-compete provisions.14
This Note is divided into two parts which detail the history, application, and
interplay between various trade secret misappropriation remedies. Part I of this Note
examines existing means by which to address trade secret misappropriation and the
various pitfalls of each. Part I is divided into three sections. The first section of Part
I examines the background and application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as well
as its common law origins. The second section of Part I examines the background
and historical application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 as both an

11

See, e.g., Panera, LLC v. Nettles, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101473, 2016 WL 4124114 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016)
(granting a temporary restraining order and concluding the plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of DTSA
claim); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F.Supp.3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. June 2016) (denying in part a preliminary
injunction on basis that injunctive relief would violate California policy disfavoring restraints on trade).
12
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(3)(A)(i)(I-II) (2016) (“In a civil action brought under this subsection with respect to the
misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may…grant an injunction…to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation described in paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the order does
not …prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the
person knows; or… otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a
lawful profession, trade, or business...”).
13
See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769 (2009) (“The dominant failure of a state-based trade secret regime is that trade
secret law differs from state to state. Consequently, the most obvious benefit of [a federal trade secret statute]
is that it will instantly accomplish what the common law, Restatement, UTSA, and Economic Espionage Act
have all failed to achieve-- uniformity, both substantive and procedural.”).
14
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration Announces New Steps to Spur Competition in the Labor Market and Accelerate Wage Growth, (Oct. 25, 2016)
(“Today, the Administration put out a call to action and set of best practices for state policymakers to enact
reforms to reduce the prevalence of non-compete agreements that are hurting workers and regional economies.”).
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anti-hacking statute and as a means of federal jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation claims when the information alleged to have been misappropriated was done
so by electronic means. Lastly, the third section of Part I examines the background
and application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
Part II of this Note transitions to a discussion of the Defend Trade Secrets Act.
Specifically, Part II is divided into two sections, which detail the background of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, recent application of the Act, and interaction between the
Act and state non-compete provisions. I conclude by arguing that the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act may be a more attractive remedy for trade secret misappropriation
claims considering recent state and federal trends disfavoring non-compete covenants
and in light of the state non-compete carve out provisions of the Defend Trade Secrets
Act.
I. EXISTING MEANS BY WHICH TO ADDRESS TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
A. Background and Application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted some version of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. States that have not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act follow common law principles that are similar to the general principles expressed
in the Act. As background, the common law principles regarding trade secret misappropriation are best identified in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.15 In
a common law district, a plaintiff must establish three elements to prevail on a trade
secret misappropriation claim: (1) a plaintiff must establish the existence of a trade
secret; (2) a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has acquired knowledge of the
trade secret as a result of a confidential relationship with the plaintiff; and (3) a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has made unauthorized use or disclosure of the
trade secret.16
With respect to the first element of a common law trade secret claim, drafters of
comment B to § 757 of the Restatement of Torts acknowledged it was not possible
to come up with an exact definition. Instead, they listed six factors courts typically
consider when evaluating whether something is a trade secret:
(1) [t]he extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease
or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired
or duplicated by others.

RESTATEMENTS (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”).
16
Id.
15
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This is not a dispositive test but rather a list of factors courts can and do consider
when establishing the first element of a trade secret claim—whether there was a
proper trade secret to protect in the first place. The Restatement § 757 factors are
important because they have continued to be referenced by courts in jurisdictions that
have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.17 One reason courts may continue to
rely on the Restatement factors is the inherent difficulty of defining trade secrets in
an increasingly complex technological landscape. A second reason may be that the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition is simply lacking. Indeed, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act defines “trade secret” as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.18
Although this definition incorporates aspects of the Restatement § 757 factors, it
does not provide as many independent factors for a court to consider and rely upon.
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret must have independent economic
value and be subject to reasonable security measures. A Uniform Trade Secrets Act
trade secret definition does not afford judges the same comfortable amount of leeway
as that provided under the Restatement.
In order for a Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim to be actionable, there must have
been a "misappropriation." The Uniform Trade Secrets Act describes several types
of conduct and defines "misappropriation" as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;
or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire
knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use,
knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means
to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or through a
person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her]
position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.19

See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although
the Act explicitly defines a trade secret…Illinois courts frequently refer to six common law factors (which are
derived from § 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts) in determining whether a trade secret exists.”).
18
Uniform Law Commission Annual Conference, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act With 1985 Amendments,
Uniform Law Commission, (Aug. 2-9, 1985). http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf.
19
Id. at 3-4
17
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The Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition of “misappropriation” does not define
“improper means.” However, courts applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have
generally held improper means to include: misrepresentation, breach or inducement
of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, theft, and bribery. In a comment to the Act,
the drafters defined “proper means” as independent invention, reverse engineering,
discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret, observation of the item
in public use or on public display, and obtaining the trade secret from published literature.20
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was completed by the Uniform Law Commission
in 1979 and amended in 1985.21 The goal of the Uniform Law Commission members
is “to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state
law where uniformity is desirable and practical.”22 Ironically, the goal of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act was to address gaps in the common law and to provide uniform remedies across state lines.23 Unfortunately, this goal was thwarted over the
years by variances in judicial interpretation and application of the law. This lack of
uniformity has caused problems for attorneys litigating trade secret claims and businesses seeking to protect valuable trade secrets in their ordinary course of business.
David Almeling, an IP attorney for the law firm O’Melveny & Myers, wrote an article
in 2009 advocating for a federal trade secrets law. In his article, Almeling noted the
following critiques about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, “among the forty-six states
that have enacted it, differences remain because legislatures in those states have modified the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and courts in those states have adopted different
interpretations.” 24 Almeling goes on to explain that:
[t]hese modifications and interpretations…include fundamental differences about what constitutes a trade secret, what is required to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available. Finally, even in instances
where states have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, many state
courts continue to rely on their own common law instead of…the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.25
Ironically, the point of Almeling’s article is to advocate for a federal trade secret
law to provide the uniformity lacking with the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act he so deftly critiques. Unfortunately, as will be explored, the newly enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act leaves much to be desired in this regard.

20

Id. at 5-6.
About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20- ULC (explaining that the Uniform Law Commission is a coalition of “practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state governments
as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands”).
22
About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20- ULC
23
Why States Should Adopt the UTSA, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UTSA.
24
Almeling, supra note 13, at 773-74.
25
Id. at 774.
21
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B. Background and Historical Application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA) was passed by Congress
to address concerns in the 1980s regarding the cyber security of federal computers
and information networks.26 Importantly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is not
a trade secret law and was never intended to serve as a federal corollary to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However, in the initial years after passage, the law was
amended multiple times. These amendments were always limited to the narrow scope
of the law’s original intent—to protect computers, “involving a compelling federal
interest.”27
However, in 1994 Congress amended the law to allow, “any person who suffered
damage by a statutory violation to ‘maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.’”28 This set
of amendments was codified at 18 U.S.C. 1030(g) and provided a new federal civil
remedy.29 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5) was amended to protect computers and
computer systems from both outside and inside actors.30 Specifically, the section
prohibited an individual who "intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer
without authorization, and…alters, damages, or destroys information in any such
Federal interest computer….”31
In 1996, the Act was amended again to broaden the scope of the law. For example, “[while the] 1994 version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), included the phrase
‘through means of a computer used in interstate commerce or communications’; this
qualifying phrase was deleted in a 1996 amendment.”32 Additionally, the phrase “federal interest computer” was replaced with “protected computer.”33 These amendments are consistent with a general broadening of the law to include all computers,
not just those with a federal interest, as originally designated under the Act.
Consistent with the legislative intent of the Act, the law was originally used to
address hacking and computer crime. However, as the Act evolved to fit the rapidly
changing technological landscape it also became a means of federal subject matter
jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation when that misappropriation occurred by
electronic means.34 Using the Act as a vehicle for federal subject matter jurisdiction

26

Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
18 U.S.C. 1030(g).
30
Buckman, supra note 26.
31
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994).
32
See Buckman, supra note 26.
33
See Buckman, supra note 26.
34
Although at first glance this seemingly conflicts with the purported goal of the newly passed Defend Trade
Secrets Act, the means by which to address trade secret misappropriation under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act required that the trade secret misappropriation occur by electronic means. While this was a growing means
by which trade secrets were misappropriated it nevertheless still left physical misappropriation of trade secrets
by more conventional means without a federal remedy, thereby creating the need for the Defend Trade Secrets
Act.
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for trade secret misappropriation highlighted the evolving dichotomy between “inside” and “outside” actors with respect to the original intent of the law. Historically,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was viewed as an “anti-hacking” statute35 and
therefore applied to outside actors who “exceeded authorized access” or acted “without access” under the terms of the statute.36 Specifically, the statute uses the phrase
“without access” ten times and the phrase “exceeds authorized access” four times to
refer to actors in violation of the statute.37 However, in the trade secret context, most
claims involve a departing employee. Thus, the question became whether or not the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act covered internal misappropriation of trade secrets by
electronic means or only outside actors who fit the more traditional description and
legislative intent of preventing hackers. One case that explores this question is
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.38
In Shurgard Storage, the District Court for the Western District of Washington
held that “employees were ‘without authorization’ to access information from their
employer's computers when they began to appropriate the employer's trade secrets
for the benefit of the competitor.”39 In that case, Shurgard sued Safeguard under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for trade secret misappropriation when Eric Leland,
a departing Shurgard employee, “sent e-mails to the defendant [Safeguard] containing various trade secrets and proprietary information belonging to the plaintiff
[Shurgard].”40 Leland went on to accept employment with Safeguard. Shurgard argued for purposes of the statute that although Leland had access to the information
while employed by Shurgard, he “exceeded” this access when he became an agent
for Safeguard. Conversely, Safeguard claimed that Leland could not “exceed” access
when it was already granted to him by Shurgard as part of his normal employment
with Shurgard.41 The court accepted Shurgard’s interpretation of “exceeds authorized
access” and in the process laid the early framework for a circuit split regarding how
courts interpret when an employee exceeds authorized access.42 Regarding application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in Shugard, Deborah Buckman said,
The court applied principles of agency law to conclude that the employees' authorized access to the employer's computers ended at the moment
when they became agents of the competitor and began appropriating information from the employer's computer for the competitor's benefit.
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Act applied
only to "outsiders" or "hackers" and was inapplicable to inside employees, noting that its express language refers to anyone who intentionally

35

See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-894 (1984).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
37
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
38
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
39
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001).
40
Shurgard Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 125 (“Under this rule, the authority of the plaintiff's former employees ended when they allegedly
became agents of the defendant. Therefore, for the purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion, they lost their authorization
and were ‘without authorization’ when they allegedly obtained and sent the proprietary information to the defendant via e-mail.”).
36
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accesses a protected computer. The court acknowledged that the original
scope of the statute may have been interpreted as so limited, but pointed
out that its subsequent amendments broadened the scope sufficiently to
cover the behavior alleged in this case.43
The Shurgard court highlighted the dichotomy between inside and outside employees and broadened the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to apply not
just as an anti-hacking statute for outside actors but also to internal, departing employees. This distinction was further emphasized in a subsequent case, Int'l Airport
Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin.44
In Citrin, Jacob Citrin served as an employee for International Airport Centers
(“International Airport”), a real estate development corporation involved in the acquisition of airport real estate.45 Citrin decided to leave International Airport and start
a competing business. While in the process of leaving International Airport, Citrin
deleted all the data off his company-issued laptop before handing in the computer.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit drew on the agency principles espoused
by the Shurgard Storage court when it said, “Citrin's breach of his duty of loyalty
terminated his agency relationship…and with it his authority to access the laptop,
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.”46 This judicial
trend toward applying agency principles to determine when an employee “exceeded
authorized access” or acted “without access” was not meant to last. In 2012, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Citrin in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Nosal”). In the Nosal case, David Nosal was an employee of Korn Ferry – a Los
Angeles-based executive search and advisory firm. Nosal decided to leave Korn
Ferry and start his own competing firm.47 After leaving Korn Ferry, Nosal convinced
some of his former colleagues who were still working for Korn Ferry to help him
start a competing business. Nosal’s fellow employees used their Korn Ferry computer
login information to access and download source lists, names and contact information
from a confidential database on the company's computer system, and then transferred
that information to Nosal to help start the competing business.48 In that case, the employees who were still working for Korn Ferry were authorized to access the database, but Korn Ferry had a policy that prohibited disclosing confidential information.49 Nosal was indicted on twenty counts, including trade secret theft. Using
Citrin, the court could have applied agency principles and reasoned that misappropriation had taken place under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because the employees Nosal solicited had stopped acting for Korn Ferry when they surreptitiously
conveyed confidential information to Nosal in breach of their duty of loyalty. Instead,

43

See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030),174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001).
44
Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
45
Id. at 419.
46
Id. at 420–21 (quoting Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at
1123, 1125).
47
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012).
48
Id.
49
Id.
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, “[T]he CFAA does not cover an employee-hacker or an insider that takes data and uses it in an anticompetitive manner
after leaving the company.” 50 The Nosal ruling laid the groundwork for a circuit
split.
Three months later, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit Nosal opinion in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller (“WEC”).51 In WEC, defendant
Mike Miller worked for WEC – a specialty welding company in South Carolina.
WEC brought suit against Miller and his assistant for downloading confidential information to a personal laptop in preparation for a planned departure to a WEC competitor.52 In that case, the court held that “the CFAA is not violated unless an employee lacks any authorization to obtain or alter the data when he or she was
employed.” 53 Conversely, “the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits take the
opposite view and support the concept that an employee-hacker violates the CFAA
whether he or she uses the data with or without financial gain.”54
Thus the circuit split regarding an employee’s scope of “authorization” and
whether it applies to inside and outside actors equally evolved from these cases and
remains in controversy. This uncertainty and un-reconciled disparity regarding interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is one of the main limiting factors
associated with using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a vehicle for remedying
trade secret misappropriation. However, as is discussed in Part III of this Note, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act still has significant advantages over the Defend
Trade Secrets Act despite this limitation.
C. History and Application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”) is divided into two sections.55
The law created two new federal criminal offenses for the theft of trade secrets. First,
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Robert C. Kain, Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Employee Hacking Legal in California and Virginia, but Illegal in Miami, Dallas, Chicago, and Boston, 87 FLA. BAR J. 36 (2013).
51
687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
52
Id. at 201-02.
53
687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
54
Id.
55
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 states: “‘(a) IN GENERAL- Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense
will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly-‘(1) steals, or without
authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade
secret;‘(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters,
destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret;‘(3)
receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or
converted without authorization;‘(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through
(3); or ‘(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as
provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. ‘(b)
ORGANIZATIONS- Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not
more than $10,000,000.” Meanwhile, Section 1832 states, “‘(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret,
that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure
any owner of that trade secret, knowingly-- ‘(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; ‘(2) without authorization copies,
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“[s]ection 1831 of the EEA, titled “Economic Espionage,” criminalizes acts done
with the intent to benefit any foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.”
56
Meanwhile, “[s]ection 1832 of the EEA, titled ‘Theft of Trade Secrets,’ pertains
to domestic acts and makes the same conduct described in section 1831 a crime regardless of whether the theft is meant to benefit a foreign government.”57 Importantly, “[s]ection 1832 differs from section 1831 by including stipulations that the
goal of the misappropriation is to harm the owner of the trade secret and to economically benefit someone other than the owner of the trade secret.”58 Significantly, the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 as introduced was solely a federal criminal statute;
therefore, the only party that had standing to bring a suit under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 was the Federal Government. This was perhaps the main limitation
(although there were others59) regarding use of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
to redress trade secret misappropriation. Regardless, the law was passed to address a
growing concern by the government that foreign actors were committing economic
espionage against U.S. companies and was meant to (again) standardize application
of trade secret misappropriation law.60 Recognizing the limitations of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 to adequately address trade secret misappropriation, the Defend Trade Secrets Act emerged as a means to yet again standardize application of
trade secret misappropriation law and provide a new, private federal cause of action
for aggrieved parties.

duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; ‘(3) receives, buys, or possesses such
information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; ‘(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or ‘(5) conspires with one or
more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. ‘(b) Any organization that commits any offense
described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000.
56
Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 310 (1998).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See id. (“The EEA does not protect trade secrets related to services (as opposed to goods), negative knowhow, or reverse engineering. Furthermore, it does not address the needs of U.S. corporations operating abroad
from trade secret theft. It also fails to adequately address the rights of victims for monetary loss sustained as a
result of the theft and misappropriation of their trade secrets. To qualify under section 1832, trade secrets must
be “related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.” Because
trade secrets explicitly must be embodied in a product in the stream of commerce, protection is limited if the
trade secret relates to a rendering of services rather than a produced ware that contains or uses the secret.”).
60
See e.g., id. (“The problem of foreign economic espionage has grown significantly since the end of the Cold
War. Testifying before joint hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information for the EEA's passage
in early 1996, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh stated that the Bureau's investigations of
economic espionage cases had doubled in the previous year from 400 to 800, and twenty-three countries had
been involved. He claimed that foreign governments are actively targeting U.S. industry and the U.S. government to steal “critical technologies, data, and information in order to provide their own industrial sectors with
a competitive advantage.” According to Freeh and other law enforcement officials, former military spies have
been redeployed by foreign governments to the commercial world, presumably ready to use their skills in other
ways. The loss to U.S. industry from foreign economic espionage is estimated at nearly $100 billion per year.)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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II. THE BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT AND
INTERPLAY WITH STATE NON-COMPETE PROVISIONS
A. Background and Legislative Intent
According to the United States Senate Report, the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA) was passed in order to harmonize variances in state application of trade secret law.61 Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have passed some version
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).62 However, state application of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been anything but uniform. Inconsistent application of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by the states has led to a confusing landscape for
businesses and employers to navigate an economy that is increasingly unbound by
traditional geographic limitations. For example, the Senate Report acknowledged the
impact of this variation among state law versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
stating,
[a]lthough the differences between State laws and the UTSA are generally relatively minor, they can prove case-dispositive: they may affect
which party has the burden of establishing that a trade secret is not readily ascertainable, whether the owner has any rights against a party that
innocently acquires a trade secret, the scope of information protectable
as trade secret, and what measures are necessary to satisfy the requirement that the owner employ ‘‘reasonable measures’’ to maintain secrecy
of the information.63
Practitioners and academics alike have long advocated for a federal trade secret
law to clarify this confusing landscape and provide parity with other forms of intellectual property already afforded federal protection.64 Indeed, the Defend Trade Secrets Act is not a revolutionary concept; it is the product of decades of advocacy and
a rapidly changing technological landscape that has led to increasing theft of U.S.
trade secrets. Moreover, the Defend Trade Secrets Act achieves its goal of providing
a federal remedy by paying homage to, and incorporating, the legislative efforts of
previous trade secret laws. Specifically, the Defend Trade Secrets Act amends the
Economic Espionage Act to provide a civil remedy and bases its definition of “trade
secret” off the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
In short, the Defend Trade Secrets Act is both new and old—an amalgamation
of existing law with a new federal application. There are five key differences between
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Defend Trade Secrets Act. First, the Defend
Trade Secrets Act definition of “trade secret” builds on the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act definition by stating that trade secrets means all forms and types of financial,
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S. REP. NO. 114-220 (2016).
See supra note 10.
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S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 (2016).
64
See e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427
(1995); see generally, Almeling, supra note 13.
62
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business, scientific, technical, economic, and engineering information.65 The definition section of the Defend Trade Secrets Act also makes clear that trade secrets can
be tangible or intangible regardless of how they are stored, compiled, or memorialized, whether that is physically, electronically, graphically photographically, or in
writing.66 Secondly, the term “improper means” expressly excludes certain conduct
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (reverse engineering, independent derivation or
any other lawful means of acquisition).67 Third, the Defend Trade Secrets Act provides for an ex parte civil seizure order.68 Fourth, while the Defend Trade Secrets
Act is not to be construed as pre-empting or displacing civil or criminal remedies
under either federal or state law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act expressly displaces
other state law regarding trade secrets or misappropriation.69 Finally, although the
Defend Trade Secrets Act provides for similar remedies as those afforded by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the Defend Trade Secrets Act expressly states that no injunction can “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship.”70 This
Note focuses on this final distinction and is arguably why the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act may be a more attractive means to address trade secret misappropriation.
B. Recent Application of the Defend Trade Secrets Act and its Interplay with
State Non-Compete Provisions
Two recent cases highlight the evolving judicial interpretation of the newly
enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act. To contrast treatment of injunctive relief by the
courts and to highlight the dichotomy that is already developing, this section examines one case from California, a state that prohibits restraints on trade,71 and one case
from Missouri, a state that does not prohibit restraints on trade. 72 Finally, this section
examines a newly filed case in the Northern District of California and explores how
that case may fit into the developing DTSA landscape.
The first court to enter a written opinion under the DTSA was the Northern
District of California in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook.73 In that case, Henry Schein Inc.
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18 U.S.C. § 1836(3) (2016).
Id.
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18 U.S.C. § 1836(6) (2016).
68
The most contentious and arguably the most significant change from the UTSA to the DTSA is the inclusion
of an ex parte civil seizure order which provides, “for expedited relief on an ex parte basis in the form of a
seizure of property from the party accused of misappropriation, a remedy available under extraordinary circumstances where necessary to preserve evidence or prevent dissemination of a trade secret.” S. REP. NO. 114-220,
at 3 (2016). The ex parte basis allows for a claimant to petition the court unchallenged for an injunctive order
to prevent the dissemination of a trade secret. This is a radical departure from the equitable relief available under
the UTSA.
69
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 7(a) (1985) (stating that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State.”.
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18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (2016).
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See generally, David R. Trossen, Edwards and Covenants Not to Compete in California: Leave Well Enough
Alone, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2009).
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See e.g., Whelan Sec. Co. v. Kennebrew, 379 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Mo. 2012) (“Missouri courts generally enforce
a non-compete agreement if it is demonstratively reasonable.” (internal citations omitted)).
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2016 LEXIS 81369 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016). See generally, Vann Pierce and Matthew Ingles, Early Returns
(Part 3 of 3): California Federal Court First to Rule Under New Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, ORRICK
66
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(“HSI”), a medical, dental, and veterinary supplies company originally sought a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against a former employee, Ms. Jennifer Cook,
before filing a complaint alleging trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA.74
In the TRO proceeding, HSI alleged that before Ms. Cook left HSI to work for a
competitor, she stole confidential information in violation of state and federal trade
secret laws and in contravention of employment agreements she signed while employed with HSI.75 The court granted the TRO which, “enjoined [Cook] from, directly or indirectly, soliciting, continuing to solicit, initiating contact with, or accepting business from, any HSI customers whose accounts were assigned to her while she
was employed by HSI.”76 Two weeks later on June 22, 2016, the court granted HSI
a preliminary injunction but repealed the customer contact restrictions on Ms. Cook
in recognition of California case law and statutory law disfavoring restraints on trade,
despite finding that HSI demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits regarding
misappropriation of trade secrets under the DTSA.77
Conversely in July of 2016 in the Eastern district of Missouri, Panera sought
and was granted a TRO to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor
based largely on that employee’s knowledge and potential use of Panera trade secrets.78 In that case, Panera, a corporation that owns and operates “bakery-café” stores
sought to enjoin a former employee from working for the pizza company Papa
John’s.79 Panera alleged that Michael Nettles, as Vice President of Architecture in
Panera's Information Technology department, had access to valuable and confidential
information, including Panera trade secrets.80 Panera sought a TRO to enjoin Nettles
from employment with Papa John’s to prevent the disclosure of valuable trade secrets.81 The court found that, “Panera [was] likely to succeed on the merits of several
of its claims, including … its request for injunctive relief in order to protect the disclosure of its confidential information and trade secrets.”82 The scope of the injunctive relief granted in the TRO by the court barred Nettles from employment with Papa
John’s, because, “Nettles’ immediate employment with Papa John’s is likely to lead
to such disclosure [of trade secrets].83
The difference between Panera and Henry Schein is clear. In states that disfavor
or prohibit the enforcement of non-compete provisions, one of the most valuable and
sought after remedies by plaintiffs is potentially unavailable—injunctive relief that
acts as a constructive restraint on trade. Companies may prefer equitable relief in this
TRADE SECRET WATCH BLOG, (June 30, 2016), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2016/06/30/california-federal-court-first-to-rule-under-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-of-2016/.
74
See generally, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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Id.
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Id. at 1079–80.
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2016 LEXIS 81369, at *6-7.
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Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Importantly, the court did not directly analyze the trade secret misappropriation claim under the DTSA framework but instead noted that, “[a]lthough the Court's analysis has focused on Panera's Missouri trade secrets
claim, an analysis under the Defend Trade Secrets Act would likely reach a similar conclusion.” Id. at 4, n. 2.
82
Id. at 2.
83
Id. at 4.
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form because it most clearly represents the original intent of the restrictive covenant
entered into by the departing employee or most effectively protects the valuable trade
secret information imperiled by the departing employee. Often, a restraint on trade is
the only way of preventing the inevitable disclosure84 of highly confidential and
highly profitable trade secrets. If a company is denied the availability of injunctive
relief, they are denied the most effective tool available. This is why the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, which does not contain a carve-out for states that disfavor or
prohibit restraints on trade, may be a more effective tool for combating trade secret
misappropriation—as it leaves open the option of injunctive relief in the form of a
constructive restraint on trade.
A recently filed case in the Northern District of California serves as an exemplar
of the confusing landscape wrought by the various trade secret laws and the myriad
considerations counsel must take into account when seeking both venue and remedy
for an alleged trade secret misappropriation. On February 23, 2017, Waymo, LLC
(“Waymo”) filed suit against Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”), alleging violation of
both the DTSA and the California UTSA.85 Waymo, a Google Inc. subsidiary, specializes in driverless car technology.86 In its complaint against Uber, Waymo alleges
that in January of 2016, Anthony Levandowski, a former manager at Waymo, stole
confidential, proprietary information and trade secrets before departing Waymo to
form his own company that would eventually be bought by Uber for $680 million. 87
Waymo alleges that. “[i]n December 2015, Mr. Levandowski specifically searched
for and then installed specialized software onto his company-issued laptop in order
to access the server that stores these particular files. Once Mr. Levandowski accessed
this server, he downloaded the 14,000 files, representing approximately 9.7 GB of
highly confidential data.”88 Waymo further alleges that, “[a] number of Waymo employees subsequently also left to join Anthony Levandowski’s new business, downloading additional Waymo trade secrets in the days and hours prior to their departure.
These secrets included confidential supplier lists, manufacturing details and statements of work with highly technical information.”89
These allegations are important for several reasons. First, although Waymo did
not discover the alleged misappropriation until some months later and is not pursuing
a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the allegation that Levandowski
had to install specialized software to access the files he allegedly stole could be a
basis for “exceeding authorized access” under the CFAA in jurisdictions that recognize the CFAA as a means of redress for trade secret misappropriation by internal
employees. Had Waymo discovered the alleged misappropriation sooner and filed
for a TRO, Levandowski could have potentially been enjoined from forming his new
company and using the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets. Unfortunately, this
route would have been rife with challenges because this suit is being brought in the
84
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Northern District of California, in which case Nosal controls. Because Nosal and the
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the CFAA controls, it would prevent interpretation of
the CFAA to apply to internal employee hacking as a means to redress trade secret
misappropriation. Thus, even though the trade secrets at issue here were allegedly
accessed by electronic means, and even though using the CFAA would allow Waymo
to file suit in California without having to consider California’s prohibition on restraints of trade, counsel for Waymo is limited to the UTSA and DTSA because of
the unresolved circuit split and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to not allow the CFAA
to be applied to internal employees when they exceed authorized access.
Moreover, because this suit is being brought in the Northern District of California for violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, counsel for Waymo will be constrained by the DTSA provision which prevents any injunction from “conflict[ing]
with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business….”).90 As examined in the discussion on Panera, this is not
a consideration in states that do not prohibit restraints on trade. Thus, while the DTSA
provides federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case, it is arguably undercut by the
venue’s prohibition on restraints of trade.

CONCLUSION
The purported goal of the Defend Trade Secrets Act was to bring order to chaos,
to harmonize the variances in judicial interpretation of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, and to empower private litigants with a new federal cause of action. This goal is
severely curtailed by the state non-compete carve-out, which hamstrings a plaintiff’s
use of injunctive relief where it might run afoul of state non-compete provisions.
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook demonstrates how seriously limiting state policies disfavoring non-competes can be on the efficacy of injunctive relief when pursued under
the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Given recent trends and White House initiatives (discussed supra) to persuade state lawmakers to oppose enforcement of non-compete
provisions, the Defend Trade Secret Act could end up being as ineffective at unifying
trade secret law as previous attempts at standardization have been.
Moreover, given business’s increasing reliance on electronic storage, it is likely
that most future trade secret misappropriation cases will involve electronic access.
Therefore, it may be preferable when bringing an action in a state that prohibits or
disfavors enforcement of non-compete provisions to proceed under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act rather than run the risk of potentially losing injunctive relief
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. However, as examined in the counterfactual
situation with the ongoing Waymo lawsuit, even this may not be a viable option until
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(3)(A)(i)(I-II) (2016), which states: “In a civil action brought under this subsection with
respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may … grant an injunction … to prevent any actual or
threatened misappropriation described in paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided
the order does not … prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed
on such employment shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows; or … otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the
practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business….”
90
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the Supreme Court reconciles the circuit split regarding whether an internal employee
can be liable for violation of the CFAA when accessing trade secrets.
As more cases are decided under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and more states
join the trend of prohibiting or disfavoring enforcement of non-compete provisions,
it may exacerbate the potential irrelevance of the Defend Trade Secrets Act as a viable means for employers to prohibit the post-employment actions of its former employees and protect valuable trade secrets which encourage innovation and propel
our economy forward.

